Information security: Designing a stochastic‐network for throughput and reliability

Todas information and communication network requires a design that is secure to tampering. Traditional performance measures of reliability and throughput must be supplemented with measures of security. Recognition of an adversary who can inflict damage leads toward a game‐theoretic model. Through such a formulation, guidelines for network designs and improvements are derived. We opt for a design that is most robust to withstand both natural degradation and adversarial attacks. Extensive computational experience with such a model suggests that a Nash‐equilibrium design exists that can withstand the worst possible damage. Most important, the equilibrium is value‐free in that it is stable irrespective of the unit costs associated with reliability vs. capacity improvement and how one wishes to trade between throughput and reliability. This finding helps to pinpoint the most critical components in network design. From a policy standpoint, the model also allows the monetary value of information‐security to be imputed. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Remembering and forgetting Mirambo: Histories of war in modern Africa

ABSTRACT

While the study of organised violence is considered essential to understanding the history of the West, and accordingly imbued with various layers of meaning and remembrance, war is widely regarded as inimical to the modern nation in Africa and stable development more broadly. Using examples drawn from primarily from East Africa, this paper considers the ways in which warfare in the deeper (‘precolonial’) past has been framed and envisioned in recent decades, in particular by governments whose own roots lie in revolutionary armed struggle and who began life as guerrilla movements. While in some cases particular elements of the deeper past were indeed mobilised in pursuit of contemporary political goals, in many other scenarios histories of precolonial violence were beheld as problematic and unworthy of remembrance. This paper highlights the paradox and ambiguity which has attended the memory of key aspects of Africa’s deeper past.     

Unsolved murders and the investigative failures of the Nigerian police force: Security and sociopolitical implications

This article focuses on the systemic failures of the Nigerian police force to unravel the mysteries surrounding homicides in the country, along with the security, social and political implications of the ongoing trend. The article draws on documented pieces of evidence of high-profile murders, along with the causes of the upsurge in murder incidences and the inhibitive factors relating to the investigative procedures of the police. The suitability of the theory of subaltern realism and the concept of third-world security predicaments in explaining the peculiarities of Nigeria’s internal security challenges is examined, along with the problems of the legitimacy of political regimes and weak borders. There is a need for the National Assembly of Nigeria to exercise its constituted powers in reawakening and supervising investigations into dormant cases of murder through its committees on police affairs, public safety and national security. The police should check its organisational failures, which may be related to using the wrong investigative approaches, low levels of information, limited resources, corrupt practices, and pressure to obtain quick results.     

Solving partially observable agent‐intruder games with an application to border security problems

In this paper, we introduce partially observable agent‐intruder games (POAIGs). These games model dynamic search games on graphs between security forces (an agent) and an intruder given possible (border) entry points and high value assets that require protection. The agent faces situations with dynamically changing, partially observable information about the state of the intruder and vice versa. The agent may place sensors at selected locations, while the intruder may recruit partners to observe the agent's movement. We formulate the problem as a two‐person zero‐sum game, and develop efficient algorithms to compute each player's optimal strategy. The solution to the game will help the agent choose sensor locations and design patrol routes that can handle imperfect information. First, we prove the existence of ?‐optimal strategies for POAIGs with an infinite time horizon. Second, we introduce a Bayesian approximation algorithm to identify these ?‐optimal strategies using belief functions that incorporate the imperfect information that becomes available during the game. For the solutions of large POAIGs with a finite time horizon, we use a solution method common to extensive form games, namely, the sequence form representation. To illustrate the POAIGs, we present several examples and numerical results.